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Jack Duval

Jack is the CEO of Accelerant, a securities litigation consulting firm.
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SEC Regulation Best Interest - State Fiduciary Laws

Posted by Jack Duval

Oct 26, 2018 7:52:58 AM

Accelerant SEC Regulation Best Interest - Logo 

This blog post continues my series on SEC Regulation Best Interest ("RBI") and the DOL Rule.

There has been some hand-wringing over the past year about the potential of a fractured fiduciary duty landscape for Broker-Dealers ("BDs") and their Registered Representatives.  The concern is that individual states will impose a fiduciary standard on Registered Representatives while the FINRA suitability standard, and ultimately SEC Regulation Best Interest ("RBI"), cover the rest.

Allow me to allay these concerns:  the fractured fiduciary landscape already exists, and has for decades.

Nevada's Fiduciary Statues

The event that started the concern was Nevada passing legislation that imposed a fiduciary duty on anyone giving financial advice.  In short, the Nevada law:  "imposes a statutory fiduciary duty as set for in Chapter 628A of the Nevada Revised Statutes on Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers."[1]

However, four other states have common law fiduciary duties for registered representatives and 31 additional states have quasi-fiduciary duties required under common law.[2]  I'm defining "quasi-fiduciary" obligations as Finke and Langdon do: those that exceed the FINRA suitability rules but do not expressly classify BDs as fiduciaries.[3]

Table 1: Fiduciary Status of Registered Representatives by State[4]

 Accelerant LLC Jack Duval - table of fiduciary status of registered representatives by state

Thus, 36 states already have some form of fiduciary duty required of registered representatives.

Voluntary Fiduciary Status for Broker-Dealers?

The existing uneven fiduciary duty landscape has not hampered BDs business efforts and I wouldn't expect it to in the future.[5]  Furthermore, if BDs were to find complying with the varying standards too taxing, they could just implement a fiduciary standard nation-wide.

Given SIFMA’s[6] long-standing resistance to a fiduciary standard, voluntary adherence to one is highly unlikely.   However, this might be more economical in the long-run, especially if more states pass their own fiduciary statutes.

As I have discussed in this blog posts series, I believe the pseudo-fiduciary standard under RBI will be difficult and expensive to implement.  BDs and their clients would be better off under a fiduciary standard.  Further, from a purely business perspective, adopting a fiduciary standard would help BDs compete with registered investment advisory firms which have been winning the battle for clients and assets.

Given the disappointment in many states with the defeat of the DOL Fiduciary Rule and RBI, it would not be surprising to see more states adopt fiduciary statutes.  Fiduciary expert James Watkins opines that “So long as states enact fiduciary laws that don’t impact a pension plan like a 401(k), they have every right to act,”.[7]

__________

Notes:

 

[1]       Nevada Secretary of State; Website; Available at: https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/licensing/securities/new-fiduciary-duty; Accessed October 25, 2018.

[2]       Michael Finke and Thomas Langdon; The Impact of the Broker-Dealer Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice; March 9, 2012; Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2019090; Accessed October 26, 2018; 13.

[3]       Id. at 14.

[4]       Id.

[5]       See supra Note 2.

[6]       Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association; https://www.sifma.org/about/.

[7]       Mark Miller; U.S. states eye protections for investors if federal regulation falters; Reuters; April 12, 2018; Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-miller-fiduciary/u-s-states-eye-protections-for-investors-if-federal-regulation-falters-idUSKBN1HJ1NT?feedType=RSS&feedName=PersonalFinance; Accessed October 25, 2018.

 

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Topics: Investment Suitability, Suitability Expert, Securities Exchange Commission, Regulation Best Interest, supervision, FINRA Suitability Rule 2111

SEC Regulation Best Interest - Lost Gains Cases

Posted by Jack Duval

Oct 4, 2018 9:12:46 AM

Accelerant SEC Regulation Best Interest - Logo 

This blog post continues my series on SEC Regulation Best Interest ("RBI") and the DOL Rule.

A "lost gains" case is one in which the claimant is asking for gains they believe they should have earned but did not.  These cases are different from the traditional securities litigation, where the claimant is asking for actual losses that have been incurred. 

Because the damage theory involves foregone gains instead of out-of-pocket losses, lost gains cases are generally considered to have a higher degree of difficulty.

On the face of it, this is common sense.  If an investor puts $10 million into an account and it declines to $5 million.  Most arbitrators can understand how the client has been damaged.  However, if the same investor puts $10 million into an account and six years later it's still worth $10 million, this is likely to generate less sympathy.

However, in my experience, lost gains cases can represent some of the most abusive fact patterns.

In the lost gains cases I have been involved with, the client’s accounts were essentially treated as an ATM for the Registered Representative.  These fact patterns involved extremely high fees charged for products that were churned into and out of the accounts at issue (as well as account-level fees).  The results were that the Registered Representative appropriated the growth of the accounts.

What growth wasn't appropriated was lost to the short-term holding of the investments.  That is, the investments were never invested as intended and allowed the time needed to generate returns.

In these cases, the clients were invested during strong bull markets but did not participate because of the abusive nature of the trading in their accounts.  

Six years later, they had experienced no growth while their Registered Representatives had made millions (literally).  In a bear market, such a pattern would exacerbate the decline in the accounts due to market forces and be discovered much sooner.  Bull markets hide these kinds of abuses, and the current historic bull market will surely be no exception.

However, what is different this time is the SEC’s pending Regulation Best Interest (“RBI”), which could be made law before the market declines.

Lost Gains Cases Under Regulation Best Interest

Under SEC Regulation Best Interest, lost gains cases should be easy.

This is because the burden of proof will be on the respondents to show their strategy was in the client's best interest and, as I've discussed in my RBI blog post series, they will need to produce contemporaneous evidence of their analyses showing how they came to that conclusion.[1]

In the fact pattern discussed above, this will be impossible.  Furthermore, a key defense will be removed.

Long-Term Time Horizons and the Risks of “Time Diversification”

In many securities litigations, a client's long-term time horizon is used as a defense to justify aggressive investments.  The logic is that the longer an investment is held, the less likely it is to generate a loss.  This is known as “time diversification”.  The problem with time diversification is that it is, at best, only partially correct, at worst it is a setup for disastrous portfolio decisions.[2]

The paradox of time diversification is that in order to benefit from higher returns (in equities usually) the client must increase their risk of interim declines in order to reduce their risk of a terminal loss.[3]

If RBI becomes law, the long-term time horizon will take on a different implication. 

Time Horizon, Fees, and Taxes under Regulation Best Interest

It has always been true that the longer a client's time horizon, the more important minimizing fees and avoiding taxes become.  This is not a matter of debate.  This is not something that reasonable minds can differ upon.  This is a 100 percent mathematical certainty.

Under RBI, this will become a key focal point.

If a client with a long-term time horizon is put into high fee products, charged high account-level fees, and/or churned into and out of commission product on a short-term basis, there is no way to argue it is in their best interest.

For instance, if fees can be reduced by one full percentage point per year, in 30 years time, the difference in terminal values will be about 30 percent.[4] 

For taxable accounts, the difference can be even more stark.  Annual after-tax returns of mutual funds often fall between one and two full percentage points compared to their pre-tax returns (the ones that are advertised).[5]

When combined, high expenses and tax-inefficient investing destroy investor returns.  In such a scenario, the broker, investment manager, and government all get paid before the investor, who is taking all the risk.[6]

Furthermore, the deleterious effects of high fees and taxes are completely return agnostic.  The return-destroying math holds true through all markets, good, bad, or sideways and compounds over time, to the investors disadvantage.

Costs Under Regulation Best Interest

As I have written about here, the SEC has recognized the importance of costs under RBI.[7]

While cost is not the only factor when evaluating an investment or investment strategy, it is one of the most important, if not the most important.  The customers tax status is also critical, which is why it is part of the profiling required under FINRA Rule 2111 and under RBI.[8]

RBI requires the Registered Representative undertake a fact specific analysis before the recommendation is made.  As mentioned above, this analysis will need to show why the recommended investment or strategy is in the best interest of the client compared to other investments offered by the firm.[9]

Any firm that can effectuate stock transactions for a client can purchase index ETFs for the same client (and most will have selling agreements with index mutual fund providers).  Thus, virtually every Broker-Dealer will be required to show why their investment or strategy  recommendation is better over the long-term than an index ETF or mutual fund on a net after-fee, after-tax basis (for their long-term investors).

This will present a significant hurdle for BDs because almost all equity investors are categorized as long-term investors, which is as it should be.[10]

Thus, all client accounts with a long-term time horizon will require an analysis that justifies the fees charged and taxes generated compared to low-fee, low-tax alternatives such as index ETFs and mutual funds.  In my opinion, this analysis will have to be rigorous, mathematical in nature, and be based on conservative assumptions.

Supervision to Avoid Lost Gains Cases

Supervisors will need to insure their Registered Representatives have undertaken a fact specific analysis for all their clients.  For those clients with a long-term time horizon, supervisors will need to insure the analyses comport to industry standards, reflect the client’s best interest given their particular facts and circumstances, and that the findings are reflected in the client’s portfolio.

__________

Notes:

[1]      Regulation Best Interest; Jack Duval; Available at: http://blog.accelerant.biz/blog/topic/regulation-best-interest; Accessed October 4, 2018.

[2]      “The Myth of Time Diversification: Analysis, Application, and Incorrect New Account Forms”; Jack Duval; PIABA Bar Journal; Spring 2006; Available at: http://blog.accelerant.biz/myth-of-time-diversification-whitepaper-0; Accessed October 4, 2018.

[3]       Statistically, the risk of interim declines is known as “first passage time probability”.

[4]       Reducing Attorney Fees (Investment Fees, that is); Jack Duval; Available at: https://blog.bant.am/index.php/2018/04/03/reducing-attorney-fees-investment-fees/; Accessed October 4, 2018.

[5]       Taxes – Another Killer of Attorney Returns; Jack Duval; Available at: https://blog.bant.am/index.php/2018/06/04/taxes-another-killer-of-attorney-returns/; Accessed October 4, 2018.

[6]        Wealth Confiscation by Your Three Investment “Partners”; Jack Duval; Available at: https://blog.bant.am/index.php/2018/09/07/wealth-confiscation-by-your-three-investment-partners/; Accessed October 4, 2018.

[7]         SEC Regulation Best Interest – Reasonable Care; Jack Duval; Available at: http://blog.accelerant.biz/blog/sec-regulation-best-interest-reasonable-care; Accessed October 4, 2018.

[8]         Under RBI, the Retail Customer Investment Profile includes “tax status”; SEC Regulation Best Interest; Release No. 34-83062; File No. S7-07-18; 406.  Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/34-83062.pdf; Accessed October 4, 2018.

[9]          A separate issue is investments not offered by the firm.  This will likely come up for advisors who only sell one type of product such as insurance.  This is a key difference between RBI and the fiduciary duty imposed upon Registered Investment Advisors.  An Investment Advisor's duties are not limited to the products their firm sells.  This is a non-trivial difference and a significant shortfall in RBI.

[10]        Short-term investors should not be invested in equities.  The received view is that only funds which can be held for five years or more should be invested in equities, although some authors suggest avoiding equities unless having a 12-year time horizon.

 

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Topics: Investment Suitability, Suitability Expert, FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability), Securities Exchange Commission, Regulation Best Interest, Fact Specific Analysis, Lost Gains Cases, supervision

SEC Regulation Best Interest - Reasonable Care

Posted by Jack Duval

Sep 14, 2018 8:12:46 AM

Accelerant SEC Regulation Best Interest - Logo 

This blog post continues my series on SEC Regulation Best Interest ("RBI") and the DOL Rule.

Knowing the Client and the Investment

As I’ve written previously, a Registered Representative must know both the client and the investment in order to make a Best Interest recommendation under the proposed SEC rules.  (This is also true under the existing FINRA Suitability Rule 2111.)

Under RBI, the SEC addresses this directly, writing: [1]

... we believe acting in the best interest of the retail customer would require a broker-dealer to have a reasonable basis to believe that a specific recommendation is in the best interest of the particular retail customer based on its understanding of the investment or investment strategy under proposed paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A), and in light of the retail customer's investment objectives, financial situation, and needs.  (Emphasis added)

Additionally, the SEC believes the principals that underlie the RBI requirements are the same as those under the DOL’s Best Interest Standard (which was a fiduciary standard):

We believe that the principles underlying our proposed best interest obligation as discussed above, and the specific Disclosure, Care, and Conflict of Interest Obligations described in more detail below, generally draw from underlying principles similar to the principles underlying the DOL's best interest standard, as described by the DOL in the BIC Exemption.[2]  (Emphasis added)

Although RBI does not impose a fiduciary duty, the SEC refers to the DOL Rule (as well as obligations under RBI) regarding how Registered Representatives will be held to a prudent expert standard:

(The DOL Rule) defines advice to be in the "best interest" if the person providing the advice acts "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with the such (sic) matter would use... without regard to the financial or other interests" of the person.[3]

Further, the proposed Disclosure Obligation, Care Obligation and Conflict of Interest Obligations described in more detail below, establish standards of professional conduct that, among other things, would require the broker-dealer to employ reasonable care when making a recommendation.[4]  (Emphasis added)

Reasonable Care

An important question, then, is what constitutes “reasonable care”?  (I am here only focusing on the reasonable care obligation concerning investments, not those regarding the obligation to know the client.)

At a minimum, reasonable care requires the Registered Representative to undertake an analysis of the potential recommended investments to express her investment thesis and choose one that is in the best interest of the client.

In short, reasonable care requires that the Registered Representative do her homework.  Additionally, the diligence undertaken will need to be evidenced in writing so that it can be supervised, and for the broker’s own protection, should litigation ensue.

Choosing Between Investments

The SEC has provided guidance on the analysis of investments in RBI, writing: [5]

We reiterate that we recognize that it may be consistent with a retail customer's investment objectives - and in many cases, in a retail customer's best interest - for a retail customer to allocate investments across a variety of investment products, or to invest in riskier or more costly products, such as some actively managed mutual funds, variable annuities, and structured products.

However, in recommending such products, a broker-dealer must satisfy its obligations under proposed Regulation Best Interest.  Such recommendations would continue to be evaluated under a fact specific analysis based on the security or investment strategy recommended in connection with the retail customer's investment profile, consistent with the proposed best interest obligation.  (Emphasis added)

Fact Specific Analysis

The “fact specific analysis” is a new requirement and, as mentioned above, will need to be evidenced for each recommendation and supervised by the broker-dealer (“BD”).

The SEC mentions variable annuities as an example of a “more costly product”.  A fact specific analysis would need to show that a variable annuity was in the client’s best interest after accounting for those costs and compared to other available options.  For most variable annuities, this will be exceedingly difficult.

In a typical variable annuity contract the client is charged two to four percent per year in total fees.  These consist of asset management fees, mortality and expense fees, administrative fees, and riders.  Academic literature has shown a typical death benefit guaranteeing the principal to be worth between one and 10 basis points per year.[6]  However, most variable annuity contracts charge 100 to 125 basis points for the guarantee.

Such a high markup is very difficult to justify (as are all the other fees).

The advantage of tax-deferred growth inside a variable annuity is overwhelmed by these extremely high fees and the net investment returns will likely never overcome them when compared to a similar allocation into index funds, which typically distribute no capital gains.

Furthermore, most variable annuities require the sacrifice of liquidity, a risk that is completely uncompensated.[7]

In order to justify the recommendation of a variable annuity under RBI, a Registered Representative would have to show, in a fact specific analysis, how it is in her client’s best interest to buy the variable annuity versus a similar allocation in index funds.

I have yet to see such an analysis and am highly skeptical that one could pass the prudent expert standard.

The Importance of Costs

The SEC recognizes the importance of costs when undertaking a fact specific analysis, writing:[8]

… we emphasize that the costs and financial incentives associated with a recommendation would generally be one of many important factors...

Furthermore, the SEC states clearly that when choosing among identical securities, RBI requires the less expensive security be recommended:[9]

Thus, where, for example, a broker-dealer is choosing among identical securities available to the broker-dealer, it would be inconsistent with the Care Obligation to recommend the more expensive alternative for the customer…

If a broker-dealer recommends a more expensive security or strategy over another reasonably available alternative offered by the broker-dealer, they must have a reasonable basis to believe the higher cost is justified and that the recommendation is in the customer's best interest.

A key word in the quote above is “identical”.  Very few investments are likely to be identical in the literal sense.  However, many are certain to be highly comparable with differences that are essentially trivial.  For instance, in the variable annuity example, a large cap blend sub-account inside the variable annuity is likely to be highly comparable to an S&P 500 Index fund.

A simple correlation analysis would almost certainly reveal that the differences were small, as would an analysis of the holdings and the sub-accounts active share.  Indeed, most funds (or sub-accounts) in the same size and style category are likely to be close to identical, although none would likely meet the literal meaning of “identical”.

The more comparable two investments are, the more important it will be to choose the less expensive option.  For products that have insurance or other features such as principal protection, an additional analysis of the costs, liquidity, guarantor risk, and other factors will be required.

Importantly, the case of identical investments isn’t the only standard the SEC sets out, indeed, it is only a special case.

Comparable Product Factors

The SEC has provided guidance on what a BD must consider when undertaking their fact specific analysis for comparable products or strategies offered by the firm:[10]

While every inquiry will be specific to the broker-dealer and the investment or investment strategy, broker-dealers may wish to consider questions such as: 

  • Can less costly, complex, or risky products available at the broker-dealer achieve the objective of the product?
  • What assumptions underlie the product, and how sound are they? What market or performance factors determine the investor’s return?
  • What are the risks specific to retail customers? If the product was designed mainly to generate yield, does the yield justify the risk to principal?
  • What costs and fees for the retail customer are associated with this product? Why are they appropriate?  Are all of the costs and fees transparent?  How do they compare with comparable products offered by the firm?[11]
  • What financial incentives are associated with the product, and how will costs, fees and compensation relating to the product impact an investor’s return?
  • Does the product present any novel legal, tax, market, investment, or credit risks?
  • How liquid is the product? Is there a secondary market for the product?

As described above, the broker-dealer's diligence and understanding of the risks and rewards would generally involve consideration of factors, such as the costs; the investment objectives and characteristics associated with a product or strategy (including any special or unusual features, liquidity, risks and potential benefits, volatility and likely performance in a variety of market and economic conditions), as well as the financial and other benefits to the broker-dealer.

Fact Specific Analysis Supervision

Perhaps most important is that Registered Representatives will have to undertake their fact specific analysis before the recommendation is made.  As discussed above, that analysis would need to be in writing and show how the recommendation is in the client’s best interest and comports with all their particular facts and circumstances, including risk tolerance and investment objectives.

If there was no analysis, or the analysis was deficient, then the recommendation would likely fail to meet the RBI standard (or might only meet it by chance) and would certainly have failed to have been supervised.

The requirement of a fact specific analysis will necessitate additional supervisory systems and oversight, and BDs will need to implement policies and procedures to make sure they comply with RBI.

__________

Notes:

[1]           SEC Regulation Best Interest; Release No. 34-83062; File No. S7-07-18; Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/34-83062.pdf; Accessed September 12, 2018.

at 141.

[2]           Id. at 58.

[3]           Id. at 108.

[4]           Id. at 59.

[5]           Id. at 147.

[6]           Mose Arye Milevsky and Steven E. Posner; The Titanic Option: Valuation of the Guaranteed Minimum Death Benefit in Variable Annuities and Mutual Funds; The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2001; Vol. 68; No. 1, 93-128.  Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.178.1519&rep=rep1&type=pdf;  Accessed September 12, 2018.

[7]           Many variable annuities allow the withdrawal of up to 10 percent of the original investment on a penalty-free basis every year.  However, withdrawals above that amount often have eight to 10 percent penalties in the first year and decline each year after that.

            Typically, investors in illiquid investments such as hedge funds and private equity funds demand an illiquidity premium of three percent per year for the loss of liquidity.  Variable annuities provide no such return premium.  Indeed, because of their fee structure, they are likely to return three percent less than the benchmark each year.

[8]           RBI at 147.

[9]           Id. at 148.

[10]         Id. at 139-40 and 143.

[11]         An interesting question arises about firms that only offer one type of product, such as insurance carriers that only sell insurance or variable products.  I will address this in later posts.

 

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Topics: fiduciary obligations, Investment Suitability, Suitability Expert, FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability), Securities Exchange Commission, Regulation Best Interest, prudent expert standard, Reasonable Care, Fact Specific Analysis

Protecting Senior Investors - Deconstructing a Supervisory Failure

Posted by Jack Duval

Aug 30, 2018 8:10:55 AM

 

This blog post continues a series I began in 2012 highlighting regulatory efforts to protect senior investors.  (My previous blog posts on protecting senior investors can be found here.)

On August 24th, The New York Times published an article relating the predatory abuse of senior investors by a broker engaging in unauthorized trading and churning of their account.[1]

Client Profile

The profile of the senior investors is typical in many abuse cases.  The father was 89 years old, had suffered two strokes and was residing in an assisted living facility.  The mother was 84 years old, had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s, and was in the process of being moved to the same facility as her husband.

There was an younger adult daughter living in a community for adults with developmental disabilities and an older adult daughter who had been overseeing the parents accounts.

Fact Pattern

In 2017, Trevor Rahn, a broker at JP Morgan, began unauthorized trading in the account (which was worth about $1.3 million at the time) and in the first six months of the year  generated $128,000 in commissions.

It appears Mr. Rahn was selling positions that had been held for years and using the proceeds to purchase new-issue closed-end funds (“CEFs”).  The closed-end fund purchases were not mentioned in the article, but Mr. Rahn’s CRD lists CEFs as a product involved in the dispute.[2]

Furthermore, the commissions generated could not have been generated from stock trades alone, and were almost certainly from high-commission new issue CEFs.  The New York Times article mentions $47,600 in commissions in August 2017.  A look at the statement page in the article reveals there were $822,000 in sales proceeds and $796,300 in purchases.  At a 1.25 percent commission rate on the purchases and sales, there would have been $20,500 in commissions generated.  Less than half of the $47,600 reported.

However, if the sales of stock were made at a 1.25 percent commission rate and the proceeds invested in new-issue CEFs paying 4.5 percent commissions, the math works out very close:

  • $822,000 sold at 1.25% = 10,275;
  • $796,300 in purchases at 4.5% = 35,833;
  • This results in total commissions of $46,108 versus the $47,600 reported.

Supervisory Red Flags Missed

There were a host of missed supervisory red flags.  So many that it defies simple explanation.  What’s worse is that many of the red flags existed before the unauthorized churning trades took place.  The following is a list of supervisory red flags that should have been triggered under standard industry practice and systems:

Pre-Trade Red Flags

The following account traits should have resulting in the account being on heightened supervision and/or generated exception reports:

  • Two senior investors, aged 84 and 89;
  • Special needs adult child;
  • An unsophisticated daughter overseeing the account;
  • High cash flow needs for two parents and one child in assisted living communities;
  • Asset allocation of 93 percent equities (and possibly higher given the six percent in mutual funds could also have been in equities), and;
  • Lien on Trevor Rahn:[3]
    • Rahn had a $763,000 lean outstanding against him from Deutsche Bank Securities.
    • Under a forgivable loan, Mr. Rahn owed Deutsche Bank $748,011 when he resigned to go to JP Morgan. Upon signing with JP Morgan, Mr. Rahn received an upfront loan of $1,404,084 and $468,000 in restricted stock.
    • He chose not to use any of his upfront cash to pay back the loan from Deutsche Bank.

Client Statement:

Accelerant Protecting Senior Investors Jack Duval - Client Statement

Trading Red Flags

Even if the pre-trade red flags were missed, the trading in the account should have triggered multiple supervisory red flags immediately:

  • Sudden and uncharacteristicaly high turnover;
  • 344 unsolicited trades being entered in one account;
  • Multiple small odd-lot orders instead of block trades;
  • Large purchases of new-issue closed-end funds, and;
  • 10 percent cost/equity ratio (the costs were 10 percent of the account value).

Account-Related Red Flags 

Finally, if the pre-trade and trading red flags were missed, the following account-related red flags should have generated supervisory inquiry:

  • Sudden decline in account value (unrelated to market movements), and;
  • Realizing over $342,000 in long- and short-term gains on sales.

Supervision

Even casual supervision should have prevented the abuse described above.  The SEC and FINRA have made the protection of senior investors a regulatory priority since 2006.  (See my blog post with a timeline of regulatory actions to protect senior investors.)  Their focus has only intensified over the years and broker-dealers have been well informed of their obligations in this area.  (Access my Protecting Senior Investors white paper.)

Because of the high potential for abuse by brokers, family members, and fraudsters, all accounts of senior investors should be on heightened supervision.  Today’s supervisory systems can easily add age-based triggers for exception reports.  Indeed, because age is a hard number and not subject to debate (such as the suitability of certain investments) this should be a trivial red flag to implement.

There can be no excuse for failing to supervise the accounts of senior investors.

__________

Notes:

[1]      “Caring for Aging Parents, With an Eye on the Broker Handling Their Savings”; Tara Siegel Bernard; The New York Times; August 24, 2018; Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/business/brokers-excessive-trading-retirement.html?login=email&auth=login-email; Accessed August 27, 2018.

[2]      CRD of Trevor Rahn; Available at: https://files.brokercheck.finra.org/individual/individual_2196155.pdf; Accessed August 27, 2018.

[3]      Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., v. Trevor Rahn; Case No. CV13-5534 RGK (VBKx).  Mr. Rahn attempted to have the arbitration decision to award Deutsche Bank the $748,011 vacated.  His claim was denied.

 

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Topics: Protecting Senior Investors, Senior Investors, fraud, Elder Abuse, dementia, Alzheimer's, supervision, financial exploitation

SEC Regulation Best Interest - The Prudent Expert Standard

Posted by Jack Duval

Aug 23, 2018 9:38:27 AM

Accelerant SEC Regulation Best Interest - Logo 

As discussed in my previous posts, SEC Regulation Best Interest (“RBI”) will require broker-dealers and their agents to put the best interests of their clients first.  What is less well understood is that RBI will also impose a prudent expert standard on Registered Representatives.

There are three broad obligations to RBI:[1]

  • Disclosure;
  • Care, and;
  • Conflicts of Interest.

The Prudent Expert Standard

I am here focusing on the Care Obligation, which the SEC has described as:

The broker, dealer, or natural person who is an associated person of a broker or dealer, in making the recommendation exercises reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence to:[2]

  • Understand the potential risks and rewards associated with the recommendation, and have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation could be in the best interest of at least some retail customers;
  • Have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is in the best interest of a particular retail customer based on that retail customer’s investment profile and the potential risks and rewards associated with the recommendation; and
  • Have a reasonable basis to believe that a series of recommended transactions, even if in the retail customer’s best interest when viewed in isolation, is not excessive and is in the retail customer’s best interest when taken together in light of the retail customer’s investment profile. (Emphasis added)

While RBI does not establish a fiduciary obligation, the SEC is clear that it views the duty to exercise reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence as similar to a fiduciary duty, writing:[3]

Under Regulation Best Interest, as proposed, a broker-dealer’s duty to exercise reasonable diligence, care, skill and prudence is designed to be similar to the standard of conduct that has been imposed on broker-dealers found to be acting in a fiduciary capacity.  (Emphasis added)

The “reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence” language, as well as the process of understanding “potential risks and rewards”, applying that understanding to the retail customer’s investment profile, and evaluating a series of recommended transactions, all necessitate coming to an expert opinion.

Indeed, coming to an expert opinion will be the only way the Care Obligation can be fulfilled.

The SEC points to the prudent expert standard in RBI, writing:[4]

We believe that the principles underlying our proposed best interest obligation as discussed above, and the specific Disclosure, Care, and Conflict of Interest Obligations described in more detail below, generally draw from underlying principles similar to the principles underlying the DOL’s best interest standard, as described by the DOL in the BIC Exemption

The BIC Exemption’s best interest Impartial Conduct Standard would require (as here relevant) that advice be in a retirement investor’s best interest, and further defines advice to be in the “best interest” if the person providing the advice acts “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with the (sic) such matters would use… without regard to the financial or other interests” of the person..  (Emphasis added)

The SEC believes the principles underlying RBI are consistent with those of the DOL rule.  The DOL language of “a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matter” is the prudent expert standard.  Thus, that is the standard that should apply to Registered Representatives making recommendations to retail customers.

Furthermore, the SEC refers to RBI as establishing “standards of professional conduct”:[5]

… the proposed Disclosure Obligation, Care Obligation and Conflict of Interest Obligations described in more detail below, establish standards of professional conduct that, among other things, would require the broker-dealer to employ reasonable care when making a recommendation.  (Emphasis added)

Knowing the Investment and the Client

As with the FINRA Suitability standard, the registered representative must know both the investment and the client in order to meet the Best Interest standard.  The SEC makes this clear in RBI, writing about:

Knowing the investment

Without establishing such a threshold understanding of its particular recommendation, we do not believe that a broker-dealer could, as required by Regulation Best Interest, act in the best interest of a retail customer when making a recommendation…[6]

Knowing the customer

A broker-dealer that makes a recommendation to a retail customer for whom it lacks sufficient information to have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is in the best interest of that retail customer based on the retail customer’s investment profile would not meet its obligations under the proposed rule.[7]

Anyone arguing that the prudent expert standard will not apply under RBI will need to overcome the SEC’s own language, the shingle theory,[8] as well as what will likely be a mountain of advertising and marketing material from the broker-dealer extoling its expertise.[9]  Furthermore, there will be the matter of the CRS Relationship Summary, which will affirm the BDs adherence to the securities law and regulations (including RBI and all the attendant obligations) and will nowhere disavow the firm’s expertise with investments.[10]

Supervisory Implications of the Prudent Expert Standard

Under RBI, broker-dealer supervisors will be tasked with making sure their registered representatives know both their clients and the investments recommended.  In theory, they are doing this already.  However, RBI, by requiring recommendations in the client’s best interest (instead of being merely suitable) will necessitate more work and documentation around knowing the investment.

I will discuss this in more detail in my next post.

__________

Notes:

[1]       SEC Regulation Best Interest; Release No. 34-83062; File No. S7-07-18; Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/34-83062.pdf; Accessed August 23, 2018.

[2]       Id. at 404-5.

[3]       Id. at 134.

[4]       Id. at 58 and footnote 108.  Also see, Accelerant blog post: The DOL Fiduciary Rule – Prudent Expert Standard; Available at: http://blog.accelerant.biz/blog/the-dol-fiduciary-rule-prudent-expert-standard; Accessed August 23, 2018.

[5]       Id. at 59.

[6]       Id. at 137.  This language also exits in FINRA RN 12-25 at Q22.  “Brokers cannot fulfill their suitability responsibilities to customers… when they fail to understand the securities and investment strategies they recommend.”

[7]       Id. at 145.

[8]       The “shingle theory” goes back to a 1943 Second Circuit decision, Charles Hughes & Co., Inc. v. SEC (139 F.2d 434; 2d Cir. 1943).  As Louis Loss wrote: “the theory was that even a dealer at arms’ length implicitly represents when he or she hangs out a shingle that he or she will deal fairly with the public.”  Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, Fourth Edition; Louis Loss and Joel Seligman; Aspen Publishers (New York); 2004; 1063.  Of course, RBI makes the relationship similar that of a fiduciary, which is far higher than one of “arms’ length”.

[9]       See, for instance, Merrill Lynch website of its Private Banking & Investment Group:  “Your private wealth advisor is dedicated to understanding your goals and experienced in the complexities of managing significant wealth.”  Available at: https://www.pbig.ml.com/; Accessed August 23, 2018.

[10]      SEC Form CRS Relationship Summary;  Release No. 34-83063;  IA-4888; File No. S7-08-18.  Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/34-83063.pdf; Accessed August 23, 2018.

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Topics: fiduciary obligations, Investment Suitability, Suitability Expert, FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability), Securities Exchange Commission, Regulation Best Interest, prudent expert standard

SEC Regulation Best Interest - The Five-Part Test

Posted by Jack Duval

Aug 1, 2018 8:51:34 AM

This post continues my blog post series on SEC Regulation Best Interest.

A note to long-time readers of this blog:  You may have noticed that I haven’t been posting for a while.  This is due to the launching of my RIA firm Bantam Inc.  I have posted over 20 blog posts on that site in the past three months.  They cover investments and should be of interest to anyone involved with securities litigations.  There are also many posts with attorney-related content.  You can find those here.

 

Accelerant SEC Regulation Best Interest - five-part test

 

The SEC Regulation Best Interest Standard

One of the most significant changes from the FINRA suitability regime to SEC Regulation Best Interest (“RBI”) is a move from subjectivity to objectivity. 

While there are some objective elements to suitability, such as what needs to be included in a client profile, the actual suitability determination is subjective.  This will change under RBI.

What the SEC has proposed is not only a new standard of best interest, but a five-part test to satisfy that standard.

The SEC defines the best interest standard as follows:[1]

The proposed standard of conduct is to act in the best interest of the retail customer at the time a recommendation is made without placing the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer or natural person who is an associated person making the recommendation ahead of the interest of the retail customer.

The Five Elements to Satisfy the Best Interest Standard

The SEC then lays out the five elements that must be met in order to satisfy RBI:[2]

This obligation shall be satisfied if:

  1. The broker-dealer or a natural person who is an associated person of a broker-dealer, before or at the time of such recommendation reasonably discloses to the retail customer, in writing, the material facts relating to the scope and terms of the relationship, and;
  2. (Disclosure of) all the material conflicts of interest associated with the recommendation;
  3. The broker-dealer or a natural person who is an associated person of a broker-dealer, in making the recommendation, exercises reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence;
  4. The broker-dealer establishes, maintains, and enforces written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and at a minimum disclose, or eliminate, all conflicts of interest that are associated with such recommendations, and;
  5. The broker-dealer establishes, maintains, and enforces written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and disclose and mitigate, or eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from financial incentives associated with such recommendations. (Emphasis added)

A few quick points on the Best Interest standard.

First, one similarity between RBI and FINRA suitability is that both are recommendation-based rules.  This means the best interest obligation is episodic and only arises at the time of the recommendation.  (As with FINRA suitability, the exception to this arises from an explicit recommendation to hold.[3])

This is a critical distinction between RBI and the fiduciary standard to which registered investment advisors are held.  A fiduciary is held to the best interest standard in all their dealings with the client, not just for recommendations.  Also, the fiduciary standard is continuous and operates throughout the relationship, not just when recommendations are made.

Retail Customers

Second, RBI applies to “retail customers” which only includes individuals (and their trusts and IRA accounts) and not to any business entities they may own.  The SEC defines a retail customer as:[4]

“… a person, or the legal representative of such person, who: (1) receives a recommendation of any securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities from a broker, dealer or a natural person who is an associated person of a broker or dealer, and (2) uses the recommendation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”

The Commissions preliminarily believes this proposed definition is appropriate, and in particular, the limitation to recommendations that are “primarily for personal, family or household purposes,” as we believe it excludes recommendations that are related to business or commercial purposes, but remains sufficiently broad and flexible to capture recommendations related to the various reasons retail customers may invest (including, for example, for retirement, education, and other savings purposes).

There is no such distinction under the fiduciary standard.  Under RBI, business accounts would come under the FINRA suitability rules.

In my next post, I will unpack the five elements that must be satisfied.

Note to securities litigators:  I am working on a white paper on RBI and as part of that have been conducting a survey of attorneys involved with customer disputes.  If you would like to participate in the survey (it’s only six questions), please send me an email at: jack@accelerant.biz to schedule a call.

_______

Notes:

[1]           SEC Regulation Best Interest; Release # 34-83062; April 18, 2018; 1.

[2]           Id. at 1-2.

[3]           Id. at 82.  “The Commission proposes to apply Regulation Best Interest to recommendations of any securities transaction (sale, purchase, and exchange) and investment strategy (including explicit recommendations to hold a security or regarding the manner in which it is to be purchased or sold) to retail customers.”  Emphasis added.  Notes omitted.  FINRA has identical language under Regulatory Notice 12-25 at Q7.

[4]           Id. at 83-4.  Notes omitted.

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Topics: fiduciary duties, SEC Regulation Best Interest, FINRA, Investment Suitability, Best Interest five elements

The Historical Origins of Fiduciary Duties

Posted by Jack Duval

Jun 21, 2018 8:36:41 AM

This post continues my blog post series on fiduciary duties and the changing regulatory landscape around a unified fiduciary standard of care for investors.

Accelerant - Jack Duval - Fiduciary Duties Expert Witness

Statue of Cicero

Given the tremendous amount of ink that has been spilled regarding the DOL Fiduciary Rule and now SEC Regulation Best Interest, I thought it would be useful to review the existence of fiduciary rules throughout history.

The idea of a fiduciary duty has existed from the beginning of humanity’s codification of the rules by which it would live.  Indeed, fiduciary duties have been central to the functioning of societies from ancient to modern times and from East to West.

In the most simple terms, a fiduciary duty arises when one person relies on another to perform a task or service for them.  The duty arises from the dependence of the one on the other.  In more modern language, trust and confidence is being reposed by the principal in the agent to carry out the agreed upon work.

Fiduciary Duties Throughout History

Perhaps the first known fiduciary duties exist in Hammurabi's Code from 1790 BC.[1]

Rules of agency, reflected in Hammurabi’s laws, developed along with commerce in Ancient Mesopotamia.  The laws primarily discuss situations in which a tamkarum, or principal/merchant, gives a samallum, or agent, either money to use for travel and for investments or purchases, or goods for trading or selling.

The Bible also has many fiduciary-related quotes, the most famous of which may be:[2]

No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other.  Ye cannot serve God and mammon.

Jumping to the East, somewhere between 475 and 220 BC, Confucius wrote in The Analects a heuristic for fiduciaries: “In acting on behalf of others, have I always been loyal to their interest?”[3]

From Ancient Greece, Plato’s Republic could be read as a metaphor for the fiduciary duties of leaders to their constituents, and the whole education process of philosopher-kings as instilling these virtues. 

The Roman’s coined the term “fiduciary” in their laws and defined it to mean:[4]

a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires.

Cicero also wrote of fiduciary obligations between agent and principal, known by the expressive terms: “mandatory” and “mandator”, respectively.  “An agent who shows carelessness in his execution of trust behaves very dishonorably and ‘is undermining the entire basis of our social system’.”[5]

Making a great leap across time, we come to Anglo-American law and the English Courts of Equity.  Scholars Aikin and Fausti write:[6]

Courts of Equity granted relief in numerous circumstances involving one person's abuse of confidence and, over time, concrete rules and precise terms related to fiduciary relationships began to form as Equity evolved.

The term "fiduciary" itself was adopted to apply to situations falling short of "trusts" but in which one person was nonetheless obliged to act like a trustee.

The second point makes sense because in non-trust fiduciary situations, the principle still owns the property, whereas in the trust situation, ownership of the asset(s) have been transferred to a trust which the trustee oversees.

Lastly, we get to American Law and Benjamin Cardozo, who, in Meinhard v. Salmon, wrote what are probably the most cited words on fiduciary duties:

Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.  As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.  Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher that that trodden by the crowd.  It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.

Interestingly, the undermining of “the rule of undivided loyalty by the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular exceptions” is what is now contemplated in SEC Regulation Best Interest.  The SEC seeks to dress up FINRA suitability rules in the raiment of fiduciary language without the “uncompromising rigidity” of fiduciary law.

_______

Notes:

[1]       Keith Loveland, JD, AIFA, CIDA.  Available at: http://solisinvicti.com/books/Law/Fiduciary%20Law.pdf.  Accessed June 19, 2018.

[2]       Matthew 6:24; KJV.  Available at: http://biblehub.com/kjv/matthew/6.htm.  Accessed June 19. 2018.

[3]       Confucius; The Analects; Translated by Arthur Waley; Routledge; London and New York; 1938; 84.

[4]       Blain F. Aikin et al; Fiduciary: A Historically Significant Standard; B.U. Law Review; 158.  Available at: https://www.fi360.com/main/pdf/BULawReview_AikinFausti_Fall2010.pdf; Accessed June 21, 2018.

[5]       Id.

[6]       Id. at 159.

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Topics: fiduciary duties, SEC Regulation Best Interest, FINRA, dol fiduciary rule, Investment Suitability

FINRA's Proposed Changes to the Churning Rule

Posted by Jack Duval

May 29, 2018 8:03:39 AM

Accelerant - FINRA - Churning - Quantitative Suitability - Jack Duval

On April 20, 2018, FINRA issued Regulatory Notice 18-13 – Quantitative Suitability, requesting comments on amendments to Suitability Rule 2111.  This is the first FINRA response to SEC Regulation Best Interest.  In it, FINRA is trying to square the existing suitability rule with a new proposal in SEC Regulation Best Interest.[1]  (My writings on SEC Regulation Best Interest can be found here.)

Proposed Changes to FINRA Suitability Rule 2111.05(c) – Quantitative Suitability

The proposed changes would be made to the Supplementary Material to Rule 2111 dealing with quantitative suitability found in under section .05(c).  In short, section .05(c) would be amended to "remove the element of control that currently must be proved to demonstrate a violation (of the suitability rule) ..."[2]  What would remain are "… the obligations to prove that the transactions were recommended and that the level of trading was excessive and unsuitable in light of the customer's investment profile."[3]

The comment period expires on June 19, 2018.

According to FINRA, it is removing the control element from the rule because it is unnecessary.  FINRA writes (from the enforcement action perspective):[4]

The inclusion of the control element has its historic roots, in part, in the perceived need to ensure that the culpability for excessive trading rested with the party responsible for initiating the transactions in actions brought pursuant to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.  That concern is not present under FINRA's suitability rule.  Because FINRA must show that the broker recommended the transactions in order to prove a Rule 2111 violation, culpability for excessive trading will still rest with the appropriate party even absent the control element.

... FINRA's suitability rule will continue to require FINRA to prove that the broker recommended the transactions and that the transactions were excessive and unsuitable in light of the customer's investment profile.

… The control element is an unnecessary layer of proof regarding the identity of the responsible party (i.e., the party initiating the transactions) and does not in any way touch on the proof needed to establish the underlying, substantive misconduct (i.e., the excessive trading activity inconsistent with the customer's investment profile.)  (Emphasis in the original, notes omitted)

Defining Churning

Churning is the effectuating of a trade for the sole purpose of generating a commission.  It can be for one transaction and does not have to be for multiple transactions, although the high transaction version is far more common.  (My previous post on churning can be found here.)

Critically, the level of activity and costs associated with the trading strategy must be judged against the individual client's profile, investment objective, risk tolerance, and involvement.  FINRA writes:[5]

Although no single test defines excessive activity, factors such as turnover rate, cost-to-equity ratio or the use of in-and-out trading may provide a basis for a finding of excessive trading.  A turnover rate of six or a cost-to-equity ratio above 20 percent generally is indicative of excessive trading.  However, lower ratios have supported findings of excessive trading for customers with very conservative investment objectives, while somewhat higher ratios have not supported findings of excessive trading for some customers with highly speculative investment objectives and the financial resources to withstand potential losses.

Most clients are buy-and-hold type of investors with moderate risk tolerances.  In these cases, even low levels of turnover and cost/equity ratios can be indicative of churning.  For example, I have seen such clients churned in portfolios laden with structured products.  These products were tax-inefficient and resulted in costs of 1.5 to 2 percent per year, when publicly traded equivalents would have cost a small fraction of that.

Alternately, a client with a speculative investment objective that wanted to trade actively (especially with only a portion of her assets) could have much higher turnover and cost/equity ratios without them be indicative of churning.

Another indicator is the level of commissions being assessed on each trade.  Is the broker charging full freight commissions (even if only on the buys)?  If so, this is more likely to be abusive than a broker charging firm minimum (or heavily discounted) commissions on each trade.

Ultimately, the assessment of any recommended investment strategy will be based on its comportment with the client's investment objective, risk tolerance, and overall profile.

Very few investors want to actively trade.  Most have no interest in the markets and even fewer have the leisure time to devote to following individual securities on a tick-by-tick basis.

These types of clients give their money to an investment professional and pay that professional to manage the money for them.  If speculative trading develops in these accounts, it is likely to be churning, even at low levels of turnover and cost/equity ratios.

Where an investor chooses a speculative trading strategy and knowingly takes the risks and is willing to pay the costs (which can add up quickly, even at low commission levels), that is their right.

Unfortunately, most speculative trading strategies don't work.  The investor is up against buildings full of computer servers engaged in algorithmic trading strategies that get the price data faster, and process their trades nearly instantaneously, before the client can even start typing in an order.[6]

Supervision

As always, broker-dealer supervisors will need to monitor accounts for churning.  These efforts should trigger red flags for accounts with high turnover and cost/equity ratios, those with a significant amount of the client's investable assets involved in the trading, those with large amounts of losses, and those where the trading does not comport with the client's profile.

Almost all compliance systems today can monitor for these triggers and generate exception reports for supervisors on an automated basis.

_______

Notes:

[1]      SEC Regulation Best Interest; Release No. 34-83062; Available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/34-83062.pdf;  Accessed May 24, 2018; 150.  “… Regulation Best Interest would include the existing ‘quantitative suitability’ obligation, but without the ‘control’ element.”

[2]      FINRA Regulatory Notice 18-13 – Quantitative Suitability; April 20, 2018; 1.  Available at: http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Regulatory-Notice-18-13.pdf; Accessed May 24, 2018.

[3]      Id.

[4]      Id. at 3-4.

[5]      Id. at 3.

[6]      See Michael Lewis’ Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt explaining how algorithmic traders are scalping even the largest institutional investors.

 

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Topics: Churning, supervision, FINRA, Quantitative Suitability, turnover ratio, cost/equity ratio

Comparing SEC Regulation Best Interest to Existing FINRA Rules

Posted by Jack Duval

Apr 27, 2018 9:30:35 AM

 

SEC Regulation Best Interest - Commissioner Kara Stein

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES US Securities and Exchange Commissioner Kara Stein.

This blog post continues a series exploring the fiduciary rules proposed by the DOL and now the SEC.  The DOL Rule posts can be found here and the SEC Rule post can be found here.

The SEC's proposed Regulation Best Interest ("RBI") is remarkable in how poorly it is crafted.  Indeed, it is a disaster.

If passed in it's current form, RBI will:

  • Not create a unified fiduciary standard as it was supposed to under the Dodd-Frank Act Section 913;
  • Confuse clients as to the duties of broker-dealers compared to investment advisors, and;
  • Pass off existing FINRA Rules and interpretations as some kind of heightened standard.

Table 1:  Comparing SEC Regulation Best Interest to Existing FINRA Rules

SEC Regulation Best Interest v. Existing FINRA Rules

For a PDF of this table click here.

As can be seen above, the only thing RBI adds are the disclosures relating to the scope and terms of the relationship and material conflicts of interest.  While these are good additions, they fall far short of increasing investor protections.

Everything else in RBI already exists within the FINRA rules.

Kara M. Stein Comments

SEC Commissioner Kara M. Stein has savaged RBI in her public statement:

... does this proposal require financial professionals to put their customers' interest first, and fully and fairly disclose any conflicting interests? No.  Does this proposal require all financial professionals who make investment recommendations related to retail customers to do so as fiduciaries? No.  Does this proposal require financial professionals to provide retail customers with the best available options? No.

Commissioner Stein also points out, as have others, that nowhere in the 1,000+ pages of related documents does RBI define what "best interest" means.  Instead, the RBI states the best interest obligation will be satisfied "if the broker-dealer complies with four component requirements: a Disclosure Obligation, a Care Obligation,and two Conflict of Interest Obligations."  (96)

Thus, broker-dealers will be able to check the boxes to prove that they complied with an undefined "best interest" obligation that already exists under FINRA rules.  This can only weaken investor protection.

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Topics: fiduciary obligations, Investment Suitability, Suitability Expert, FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability), Securities Exchange Commission, Regulation Best Interest, erisa fiduciary expert, fiduciary expert

SEC Regulation Best Interest

Posted by Jack Duval

Apr 20, 2018 8:18:52 AM

Accelerant SEC Regulation Best Interest - Logo 

 

This blog post continues a series exploring the fiduciary rules proposed by the DOL and now the SEC.  My previous blog posts can be found here.

On Wednesday, April 18, 2018, the SEC issued a number of rule proposals designed, in theory, to "unify" the obligations of registered representatives of broker dealers with those of registered investment advisors.

It does no such thing.

Broker-dealers and their registered representatives will not be fiduciaries under Regulation Best Interest.  Investment advisors will remain fiduciaries.

Essentially, Regulation Best Interest will take many of the obligations that already exist in the FINRA Rules and Regulatory Notices and bring them under the SEC's aegis.  Indeed, the SEC stated:

As discussed herein, some of the enhancements that Regulation Best Interest would make to existing suitability obligations under the federal securities laws, such as the collection of information requirement related to a customer's investment profile, the inability to disclose away a broker-dealer's suitability obligation, and a requirement to make recommendations that are "consistent with his customers' best interest," reflect obligations that already exist under the FINRA suitability rule or have been articulated in related FINRA interpretations and case law.  (Emphasis added.  Regulation Best Interest; 10)

This means the suitability standard will remain for registered representatives with some additional language about the "best interests" of the client.  I will try to define exactly what the additional "best interest" language actually means in subsequent posts.

The SEC has released approximately 1,000 pages relating to this proposal.  You can find the three related releases here:

Release No. 34-83062; Regulation Best Interest;

Release No. IA-4889; Proposed Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers; Request for Comment on Enhancing Investment Adviser Regulation;

Release No. 34-83063; form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV; Required Disclosures in Retail Communications and Restrictions on the use of Certain Names or Titles.

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Topics: fiduciary obligations, Investment Suitability, Suitability Expert, FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability), Securities Exchange Commission, Regulation Best Interest

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